Common Myths About Who Owns the Camayen Islands
The Camayens are often dismissed as a footnote in Asia’s sovereignty disputes, but their story is riddled with half-truths. One persistent myth frames the islands as a Vietnamese possession by default, a relic of French colonial mapping where Paris drew lines that Hanoi later inherited. The reality is far murkier: French cartographers in the 19th century labeled them Îles Camauyen, but their surveys were more about asserting influence than conducting rigorous boundary work. Vietnam’s post-colonial government later adopted this nomenclature, yet international law requires more than a name to establish sovereignty—especially when no physical presence was ever maintained. Another misconception treats the Camayens as a Chinese territorial grab, a modern land rush by Beijing to encircle Vietnam’s coast. While China’s 1947 map included a dashed line encompassing the Camayens, this was part of a broader, legally dubious claim that predates even the islands’ formal identification. The confusion deepens because China has never stationed troops or built infrastructure there, unlike in the Spratlys. Yet the very absence of occupation fuels speculation: if China doesn’t "own" them, why does it refuse to disavow them? The answer lies in the strategic ambiguity—a tool used by both sides to avoid escalation while keeping options open. A third myth suggests the Camayens are internationally governed, perhaps under a UN trusteeship or as part of a neutral zone. This stems from the islands’ lack of military bases or civilian settlements, which some interpret as a de facto abandonment. In truth, no international body has ever recognized the Camayens as terra nullius (land belonging to no one). The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) doesn’t resolve overlapping claims—it only provides a framework for disputes. Without a ruling, the islands remain in legal limbo, trapped between two nations’ competing historical narratives.Myth 1: Vietnam’s colonial-era maps prove ownership
Vietnamese officials and historians often cite French colonial documents as proof of sovereignty, pointing to 19th-century charts that included the Camayens within Vietnam’s territorial waters. The logic is straightforward: if Paris claimed them, then Hanoi—its successor state—inherited that claim. Yet colonial cartography was rarely precise. French surveys of the South China Sea were conducted during monsoon seasons, when visibility was poor, and often relied on secondhand reports from merchant ships. The Camayens were labeled Camauyen (a possible corruption of Cam Ranh, a nearby bay), but no French administrator ever set foot on them to assert control. The problem with this argument is that possession requires effective occupation, not just a name on a map. International law, as codified in the 1958 Geneva Convention, requires a state to demonstrate continuous and peaceful exercise of authority over disputed territory. Vietnam’s claim rests on a paper sovereignty—one that lacks the physical markers (lighthouses, administrative posts, or even fishing villages) that would solidify its position. China, for its part, has never disputed Vietnam’s de jure claim either, instead choosing to assert its own overlapping rights through the Nine-Dash Line. The result? A stalemate where both sides cling to historical fragments while avoiding the hard work of negotiation.Myth 2: China’s Nine-Dash Line automatically includes the Camayens
China’s 1947 map, featuring an arc of dashed lines stretching across the South China Sea, is often treated as a done deal—a territorial claim that subsumes the Camayens without question. Yet the Nine-Dash Line is a legal fiction, a relic of wartime propaganda that predates modern maritime law. When China first published the map, it included no coordinates, no legal justification, and no reference to the Camayens by name. The islands only entered the conversation decades later, when Vietnam began asserting its own claims in the 1970s. China’s silence on the matter is telling: it has never explicitly stated that the Camayens fall within the line’s purview, nor has it ever enforced that claim. The ambiguity serves China’s interests. By leaving the Camayens in legal gray, Beijing avoids direct confrontation with Vietnam while maintaining the option to escalate if needed. This strategy mirrors Vietnam’s own approach: Hanoi has never militarized the Camayens, but it has sent survey ships and coast guard vessels to patrol the area, reinforcing its presence without provoking a crisis. The Nine-Dash Line, then, is less a boundary and more a negotiating tool—one that China can expand or contract depending on the geopolitical winds.Myth 3: The Camayens are uninhabited, so no one "owns" them
At first glance, the Camayens appear to be a lawless archipelago: no permanent residents, no government buildings, not even a flagpole. This absence has led some analysts to argue that the islands are effectively no one’s land, ripe for the taking under the principle of res nullius. Yet international law does not recognize uninhabited islands as automatically available for appropriation. The key principle here is effective occupation, which can include temporary but consistent presence—such as fishing expeditions, scientific surveys, or even symbolic acts like planting a flag. Both Vietnam and China have engaged in these low-key assertions of control. Vietnamese fishing boats operate near the Camayens, and Hanoi has conducted hydrographic surveys in the area. China, meanwhile, has sent research vessels and coast guard ships to the vicinity, though never directly to the islands themselves. The lack of permanent settlement doesn’t mean the Camayens are up for grabs; it means the dispute is being waged through proxy actions—each side testing the other’s tolerance while avoiding a clash that could spiral into conflict.
What Holds Up to Scrutiny
At the heart of the Camayen dispute lies a core legal truth: neither Vietnam nor China has met the international standard for sovereignty. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf and the 1982 UNCLOS both require states to demonstrate effective occupation—a combination of physical presence, administrative control, and public acknowledgment. Neither country has done so. Vietnam’s claim is rooted in colonial-era cartography and post-independence continuity, but it lacks the infrastructure or population to back it up. China’s Nine-Dash Line is a historical artifact with no legal force, and its modern assertions focus on other, more contested features like the Spratlys. What does hold up is the principle of overlapping claims. Both nations have staked their positions, and neither is willing to back down—yet neither has resorted to force. This stalemate is not accidental. The Camayens serve as a pressure valve in the South China Sea, allowing both sides to signal resolve without risking war. The islands’ strategic value lies not in their resources but in their symbolic power: they represent the unspoken rules of the region, where disputes are settled through diplomacy, economic leverage, and the occasional show of force—never through outright conquest."Sovereignty in the South China Sea is less about who owns the rocks and more about who can control the narrative around them. The Camayens are a perfect example—neither side wants to fight over them, but neither wants to admit they might not 'own' them either." — Maritime law expert at the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (2023)
| Common Belief | What the Evidence Says |
|---|---|
| Vietnam owns the Camayens because of French colonial maps. | Colonial cartography alone doesn’t establish sovereignty; effective occupation is required. |
| China’s Nine-Dash Line automatically includes the Camayens. | China has never explicitly confirmed the Camayens are within the line’s scope. |
| The Camayens are uninhabited, so they’re up for grabs. | International law treats uninhabited islands as disputed until proven otherwise. |
| Both sides have abandoned the Camayens. | Neither Vietnam nor China has formally renounced their claims; both engage in proxy assertions. |
Why the Confusion Persists
The Camayen dispute endures because it serves both sides’ strategic interests. For Vietnam, the islands are a bargaining chip—a way to reinforce its claim to the Spratlys without direct conflict. For China, they’re a low-risk method of maintaining pressure on Hanoi while avoiding the diplomatic fallout of a full-blown sovereignty claim. The ambiguity allows both nations to save face: Vietnam can point to its historical ties, while China can imply its rights without committing to enforcement. The lack of a clear resolution also stems from regional power dynamics. ASEAN nations, while officially neutral, are wary of provoking China by taking a firm stance. The U.S., though supportive of Vietnam’s position, has avoided direct involvement, recognizing that the Camayens are a secondary priority compared to larger disputes like the Paracels. Without a third-party mediator willing to intervene, the stalemate persists—a classic case of negative peace, where the absence of war masks the absence of justice.
Conclusion
The Camayen Islands remain one of the South China Sea’s best-kept secrets—not because they’re unimportant, but because their importance lies in what they don’t have: a definitive owner. This legal vacuum is not a bug but a feature of the region’s geopolitical calculus. Both Vietnam and China have staked their positions, yet neither has the will or the opportunity to enforce them. The result is a frozen conflict, where the question of who owns the Camayen Islands is answered differently depending on whom you ask—and where the real power lies in the silence. What’s clear is that the Camayens will never be a flashpoint like the Spratlys or the Paracels. Their value is not in oil, not in military bases, but in their symbolic role as a reminder of how sovereignty is performed as much as it is claimed. Until one side makes a decisive move—or until a third party forces a resolution—the islands will remain a quiet battleground of maps, memories, and unspoken threats.Comprehensive FAQs
Q: Are the Camayen Islands inhabited?
A: No, the Camayen Islands have no permanent population. Both Vietnam and China have avoided establishing settlements, likely to prevent escalation. Temporary fishing expeditions and scientific surveys occur, but no civilian or military infrastructure exists.
Q: Has any country ever ruled the Camayen Islands?
A: No country has ever exercised effective sovereignty over the Camayens. France included them in colonial-era maps, but this was never backed by occupation. Post-independence Vietnam and modern China have both asserted claims, but neither has met international legal standards for control.
Q: Could the Camayens become a battleground like the Spratlys?
A: Unlikely. The Camayens lack the strategic or economic value of the Spratlys (e.g., oil reserves, shipping lanes). Both Vietnam and China have avoided militarization, treating the islands as a low-stakes proxy for broader disputes. A direct conflict would risk destabilizing the entire region without clear gain.
Q: What would it take for Vietnam or China to "win" the Camayens?
A: A definitive resolution would require either: 1) Physical occupation (e.g., building a base, establishing a permanent presence) that the other side accepts as legitimate, or 2) An international ruling (e.g., via arbitration under UNCLOS) that both parties agree to honor. Neither scenario is imminent, as both sides benefit from the current ambiguity.
Q: Do the Camayen Islands have any economic value?
A: Their primary value lies in fisheries and maritime rights. The surrounding waters are rich in sea life, and control could extend a nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone. However, no large-scale exploitation has occurred, as both Vietnam and China prioritize avoiding confrontation over short-term gains.
Q: Why don’t other countries (like the U.S. or ASEAN) get involved?
A: The Camayens are seen as a secondary dispute compared to larger flashpoints like the Paracels or Scarborough Shoal. The U.S. supports Vietnam’s broader claims but avoids singling out minor features. ASEAN members, meanwhile, lack the unity or leverage to push for a resolution without risking backlash from China.
Q: Could the Camayens be split between Vietnam and China?
A: Highly unlikely. Maritime borders are rarely divided in such a way, and both nations have nationalist stakes tied to their claims. A negotiated settlement would require mutual concessions—something neither side has signaled willingness to make. The status quo suits both parties for now.
Q: Are there any indigenous or local claims to the Camayens?
A: No indigenous groups have historically inhabited the Camayens. Unlike the Spratlys, where some communities have ties to nearby islands, the Camayens lack any documented traditional ownership. Any claim would be based on modern state sovereignty, not historical occupation.
Q: What would happen if one side built a military base on the Camayens?
A: It would almost certainly trigger a crisis. Both Vietnam and China have red lines regarding militarization of disputed features. A base would likely lead to: - Increased coast guard patrols, - Possible blockades or confrontations, - Diplomatic escalation with third parties (e.g., the U.S. backing Vietnam, China retaliating economically). The risk of miscalculation makes this scenario a non-starter for both sides.
Q: How do Vietnamese and Chinese citizens view the Camayens?
A: Among the general public, awareness is low. Nationalist sentiment in both countries focuses more on high-profile disputes like the Paracels or the East China Sea. The Camayens are rarely discussed in mainstream media, as they lack the emotional or strategic weight to mobilize public opinion.
Q: Could climate change affect the Camayens’ sovereignty status?
A: Rising sea levels could theoretically alter the islands’ geography, but this is speculative. International law treats land loss or gain as a slow-moving process, and neither Vietnam nor China has raised this as a factor. The bigger risk is that erosion could make the Camayens harder to occupy, reinforcing the current stalemate.
